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El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar ventajas y desventajas 
asociadas a la utilización de "pruebas de admisión" como 
predictoras de performance en programas de estudio de grado. 
El trabajo analiza información relativa a performance de 
estudiantes de las carreras de economía y de dirección de 
empresas. Esta performance se vincula con resultados en 
examenes de admisión. El trabajo analiza aspectos adicionales 
relativos a performance de alumnos, en especial (i) ritmos 
diferenciales de progreso y (ii) diferencias en el grado en que 
los alumnos tienen "áreas de interés/habilidad" definidas. El 
trabajo concluye que los examenes de admisión constituyen 
una herramienta de valor aún cuando las predicciones que de 





This paper discussed advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the use of "admission tests"  as predictors of 
performance in undergraduate studies programs. The paper 
analyzes performance of economics and business 
administration students. This performance is linked to 
admission tests results. The paper also analyzes aspects of 
performance related to (i) differential progress through time, 
and (ii) differences in the extent to which students have "areas 
of interest/ability". The paper concludes that admission tests are 
a usefull tool even when predictions derived from them are far 
from perfect.  
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 The prediction of individual performance attracts considerable interest. In the 
business world, decisions have to be made on whom to hire and whom to promote. For 
both of these decisions, information (of different kinds) is used to infer future 
performance. Track record in previous employment, academic training, interviews, 
references and personality and intelligence tests are some of the types of information 
that are used for deciding. Mistakes are made: in fact Lawrence Peter cogently argued 
that, sooner or later, everybody is promoted to his/her "level of incompetence" (Peter, 
1979). More seriously, organizational theorists have pointed out some of the difficulties 
in predicting performance using (past) data: the highest-ranking employee may not 
necessarily be the employee with higher managerial potential (see Jensen page 213). 
Similarly, in the world of education decisions are required on admittance, financial aid, 
letters of recommendation and other matters. These also require prediction of the 
candidate´s future contributions. 
 Universities attempt to make "good" decisions regarding the potential of 
candidates for academic study. The quest for "rigor" points in the direction of only 
admitting those suficiently talented and motivated. Less desirable candidates - 
according to this viewpoint - are steered into non-professional jobs or into low-stress 
academic programs. Some universities may try to develop a reputation for rigor, as well 
as for "producing" graduates who promise future professional excellence. This may 
require  "screening" devices: typically at admission time,  but also possibly during the 
program of study.  
This paper analyzes the usefulness of admissions exams as a tool for predicting 
academic performance, and ultimately for deciding admission into academic programs. 
The "admission exam" considered here is administered by an Argentine university 
(Universidad del CEMA) as a requirement for entry into its academic programs. The   3 
paper discusses the value  of  these types of exams for decision-making, and explores 
ways in which  additional information might  supplement  test results.  
 
II. Admission Tests and Academic Decisions 
 
 Admission to undergraduate education frequently requires the candidate to take 
some type of "admission test". These tests may be administered by the universities 
themselves, by a specialized test-taking organization (such as the ETS in the U.S), by 
a government body or by schools. In Argentina, the first option applies: universities 
requiring admission tests administer their own. This "institution specific" test is less 
usefull for the candidate, as it cannot be used to apply to a different institution. In some 
cases,  test are used (succesivelly) for entry into more than one institution as a result of 
institutions waiving admission tests for students who have obtained admission to a 
"comparable" program elsewhere. Institution-specific tests are also less usefull for 
those administering them than tests such as the SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) that 
exists in the U.S. Indeed, the "SAT-type" tests allows prospective candidates to be 
benchmarked against a substantial data base instead of against a  smaller sub-group 
of candidates of a particular institution. Decisions, then, are based on "how good"  
candidates are as compared to the whole population to which they belong.  
 Rosovsky (1990) describes admission decisions in U.S. universities. According 
to the author, "selectivity" varies widely between institutions: some 17-20 percent of 
applicants are accepted into Ivy League institutions such as Harvard, Princeton and 
Yale;  in prestigious public universities such as Berkeley and Wisconsin the figure 
increases to 50 - 80 percent. However, some 95 percent of U.S. institutions of higher 
education show "comparative lack of selectivity" (Rosovsky, page 61-62). "Selectivity"  
in U.S. elite institutions, moreover, is not based exclusivelly in choosing students from 
a SAT ranking; this metric is "supplemented by subjective, qualitative, non-quantifiable 
and personal components" (Rosovsky page 63). In contrast, elite institutions in Japan 
and in France base their decisions on "objective" performance measures such as test 
results. According to Rosovsky the admission procedure in elite U.S. institutions is: 
 
......an excercise in social engineering, involving high school grades, 
essays, interviews, recommendations from teachers, and above all a 
general vision concerning the composition of the ideal freshman 
class. That ideal is most easily defined as an optimum degree of 
diversity - hence my allusion to Noah´s Ark - within the framework of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Los puntos de vista vertidos en esta publicación son los del autor y no necesariamente los de la 
Universidad del CEMA.    4 
academic excellence, thereby maximizing the opportunity of the 
students to learn from each other.  
 
 
In  Argentina, the admission decision varies widely according to the type of 
university. Public universities - with the exception of some medical schools - are (as 
regards to entry) mostly non-selective. However, although no substantial barriers to 
entry exist, an important number of students have difficulties in completing the first year 
of study. Selectivity  then is not a matter of obtaining admission, but of survival in 
coursework, particularly in the first and second year of study.  
Argentine private institutions vary in their quality and rigor. As in the U.S., some 
institutions of higher learning offer little more than tertiary, vocational-type programs. 
Others, however, offer programs of high quality. Available data does not allow 
comparisons to be made on the basis of selectivity in admissions; however entry-level 
selectivity is probably low even in the high-quality programs. As in public institutions, 
students "are allowed in, but are not guaranteed of finally obtaining a diploma".  
Admission policies face political and economic realities. Public institutions suffer  
congestion in many academic programs, but cannot implement "restrictive" admission 
policies because of opposition from student bodies (who participate in university 
governance). The term "congestion" as used above denotes a situation where 
admission of an extra student causes a reduction in the quality of education of the rest 
of the students. Note that congestion may or may not be present in educational 
programs. Also note that if the students  benefit not only from contact with professors, 
but with fellow students as well (see Rosovsky quote above) an extra student may 
result in an increase in the quality for the rest of the students.  
Private institutions, on the other hand, may find that restricting admission limits 
possibilities for growth. Further,  in these institutions congestion problems are normally 
not severe (the student supplies funds that can be used to expand buildings, buy 
computers and hire professors). Thus, a reasonable policy may be that of "liberal" 
admissions with increasing academic requirements over time. But: ¿Is this a "corrrect" 
policy ? ¿ Should "marginal" candidates be screened before entry ? Answer to the 
previous questions hinges on the extent to which an admission test can accuratelly 
predict future performance. If, for example, most  students with "poor" admission 
grades will fail after the first semester of classes, or (particuarly) if their presence will 
reduce the quality of educational services received by fellow classmates, the "correct" 
policy may be to deny entry (or insist that the candidate take remedial courses). If, on 
the other hand, admission tests are only weakly correlated with subsequent   5 
performance, either (i) the tests have to be revised, (ii) course grading criteria has to be 
studied or (iii) it has to be acknowledged that students are not "tied" to the good or bad 
performance they had at test date; they can (perhaps with some effort) make up for 
deficiencies in high school education.  
  
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
 Data set G is comprised of 90 graduates of 4-year undergraduate programs in 
economics and in business management. Data set S, on the other hand, is comprised 
of 91 students.
2  These are enrolled in the second, third and fourth year of studies. 
First-year students are not included because of lack of performance data. The 
empirical analysis is focused on answering the following questions. First, what is the 
predictive power of admission tests as relates to future academic performance. 
Second, do different dimensions of admission tests (quantitative, verbal) have 
differential value as predictors. And lastly, what alternatives - if any - can be devised to 
standard admission tests as relates to prediction of future performance.  
  
III.1  Admission Tests and Academic Performance  
 
Performance in coursework (as measured by graduating GPA)  shows 
considerable variability. Moreover, the frequency distribution of GPA is quite different 
for students enrolled in the management as opposed to the economics program  
(Graph 1). In the former, the distribution is skewed to the right and shows large 
variance. Average GPA for these students is 6.6. In contrast, the distribution of GPA for 
economics students is left-skewed; moreover variability appears (at least visually 
inspecting the graph) lower than for the management program. For economics students 
average GPA is 7.5. This represents high academic achievement (a slightly higher 
GPA of 8 entitles to an honors degree).  The data contained in Graph 1 suggests that 
variation occurs within as well as between academic programs. Initial (pre-university) 
"human capital" may account for variations such as noted previously; however it is also 
possible that variations area caused not by "human capital" but by different learning 
objectives of students.  
A superficial analysis of results in Graph 1 suggests than many (30-40 percent) 
of management-oriented students either lack the initial-level training to be able to 
                                                        
2 The total available records was 147 for data set G and 132 for data set S.  Observations were discarded 
because of missing data on admission tests.  Admission test data may be missing because: (1) admitance   6 
perform at a high standard. However, it is also possible that - given their more applied 
orientation - they are not especially interested in achieving high grades in academic 
study.  Probably, a medium-effort completion of an academic program is deemed 
adequate for their future objectives.  
 Both of the above possibilities are explored in Graph 2. Distributions of "entry-
level human capital" (as measured by the admission test) are shown. Candidates who 
subsequently completed an economics program appear to be "better" than those 
completing the management program (admission score 71 for economics, 64 for 
management). However differences between both groups of students in this metric 
appears smaller than differences in academic achievement as reported in Graph 1. The 
point to be made is the following: heterogeneity of motivation and objectives, or in 
perceived “benefits” of high grades  may be more important (in determining outcomes) 
than differences in simple measures of "initial human capital stock".  Management 
students are not  substantially "worse trained”  in high school  than their economics 
counterparts, the difference seems to lie more in the area of motivation and personal 
objectives.  
 Linear regression model results (Annex 1)  suggest that student performance 
(as measured by GPA) can be predicted using as independent variables the program 
that the student is enrolled in (economics or management) and admission test results 
in verbal and quantitative ability. Regression (I) uses data set G (graduates) and 
defines "performance" as graduating GPA. Program of study (Economics = 1) and 
mathematics test results are both significant (p 0 .10). Note, however, the low R-
squared associated with this regressions: predictions can be made, but only with a 
large error. These results are similar to those found by the author in an analysis of 
academic performance in graduate programs (Gallacher, 1998).
3 Regression (II) uses 
both data sets G and S. Here the dependent variable is GPA for the first 8 courses 
taken (first year of studies). Regression (II) provides additional insights. In particular, in 
this regression test performance in verbal ability appears a significant variable (p = 
.001).  
Graph 3 shows additional information of the prediction error resulting from the 
use of the simple regression of Anex 1. Candidates classified as "somewhat weak" 
according to prediction (predicted GPA ranging from 6.0 to 6.5) subsequently at 
graduation showed GPA values ranging from "weak" ( <  5.5 )  to "very good/excellent" 
                                                                                                                                                                    
test was waived (typically the case for transfer students) or (b) test data is not available for the student.  
Observations for students with courses transfered from other universities were also deleted. 
3 This research reports that admission exam test results is significant as an explanatory variable predicting  
overall GPA; however R-squared values of regressions (which included as additional variables age, sex, 
high school type and undergraduate education) were in the order of 0.25 - 0.50.    7 
( 7.5 - 8.0 ). Further, 8 (out of a total of 19) students in this class achieved GPA values 
equal or higher than 7, a very satisfactory result. Similarly, "strong" candidates 
(predicted GPA´s in the 7.5 - 8.0 bracket) showed performance varying from "below 
average" (GPA < 6.5) to "excellent" (GPA > 8.5). Visual inspection of Graph 3 suggests 
the possibility that the simple regression model overpredicts performance when 
predicted GPA is "low" and undepredicts when predicted GPA is "high": i.e. a non-
linear relationship between independent variables may more accurately reflect the 
underlying relationship. However, preliminary analysis regressing residuals against  y-
hats or against y-values did not yield significant results. This issue, however, can be 
explored in futher research.  
 Data points included in all graphs (and regressions) do not account for students 
abandoning their programs before completion. However, a non-negligible number of 
students abandon the program before finishing one year of studies, either voluntarily or 
because of not achieving minimum required GPA. The admission tests of these 
students show a GPA somewhat - but not markedly - lower than the class average. 
That is, it is not clear that they "fail" due to insufficient scholastic aptitude. Most 
probably, motivation plays an important part.  
 A relevant topic concerning performance relates to improvement over time. 
Take two students A and B.  Student A shows a higher (graduating) overall GPA than 
B. However, B´s GPA in the last year of study is identical to A. That is, "B started badly 
but ´caught up´ with A".  In a sense, B can be though of a compensating through time 
deficiencies in initial human capital. Alternativelly, B is a "late bloomer" that only later 
discovers his interest in academic work.  This situation can also arise if A "fizzles out" 
while B maintains his steady plod forwards. Decreasing performance difference among 
students over time can also arise due to the fact that  first and second years emphasize 
"hard" (mathematics and statistics) courses that  are alien to more "practical-oriented" 
students.   
 Let GPA1 denote performance in the first year of studies and (as before) GPA 
denote overall performance. Hacer con GPA4/GPA1. The ratio GPA/GPA1 (if > 1) is an 
estimate of "improvement" during an academic program. Graph 4 shows a negative 
relation between predicted performance at entry and the GPA/GPA1 ratio. This 
negative relation is confirmed regressing the GPA/GPA1 ratio on predicted GPA (Annex 
2 Regression III). This suggests that "less atractive" candidates show a greater 
improvement in academic performance than those with better credentials (as measured 
by admission tests) at entry. Note that a greater rate of improvement through time may 
suggest - at least to an optimist - that "less desirable" candidates may yet attain   8 
performance levels comparable to those initially better endowed with academic talents.  
The turtle finally catches up with the hare.  
 "Academic progress" results should be interpreted with care due to the fact that 
"weaker" students may choose an academic program with (comparativelly) less 
stringent demands. If so, progress for these students might be overestimated, as 
"stronger" students who serve as a benchmark take courses characterized by a higher 
degree of difficulty. The bottom of the matter, however, is that comparisons of 
"progress" across programs can be difficult as the concept of "learning" may be 
interpreted differently for students being evaluated in "harder" as compared to "softer" 
subjects.  
 
III.2  Abilities and Productive Specialization 
 
 The "Error Type I" and Error Type II"  used in statistical theory are relevant for 
understanding the use of admission tests for purposes both of admissions as well as 
financial aid. In the context of this paper, the first type of error relates to accepting a 
student that should be rejected. In turn, rejecting a student that should be accepted 
results in Error Type II.
4  A  "strict"  admissions policy results in a lower probability of 
error Type I but a higher probability of Error Type II.  
 Production of "substandard" graduates results in reputational loss for the 
institution. Future demand for educational services may be reduced. Reputational loss 
also affects graduates: their degree is "cheapened", with resulting decrease in income-
earning opportunities. It is difficult, however, to come up with an adequate definition of 
"substandard".  A graduate with modest academic performance may yet contribute in 
some area of business, art, public service or even academics. Witness, for example, 
Steve Jobs´ 2005 commencement speech in Stanford University: Jobs dropped  out of 
an undergraduate program and only continued attending those classes (unofficially) in 
which he had personal interest. Among them caligraphy. But later on he founded Apple 
Computer.  
 A "substandard" graduate may be the one that finds it difficult or impossible to 
find the niche where his/her abilities might be productively used. If this is the case, the 
problem is one of matching abilities/preferences with productive specialization (niches) 
in order to bring about efficient exchange.  The problem of "substandard" can then be 
approached by analyzing whether a graduate has found - during his academic program 
- some area of study where abilities may be used. Given two students A and B with 
identical overall academic performance (as measured, for example, by graduating   9 
GPA) the one with higher variability (across courses) in grades can be assumed more 
"narrowly focused". Arguably, in future exchange relationships this student can 
specialize and thus achieve high personal productivity. In other words, students 
graduating with "low"  average GPA have "better prospects"  when the variability in 
their course grades is high than when the low GPA results from "substandard behavior" 
in all coursework. Thus, highest grades during coursework are an indicator of "potential 
area of interest/ability" of the student. In order to take into account overall performance 
of the student,  the existence of this "potential area of interest" can be proxied by the 
ratio highest/lowest grades achieved by the student. For example, for two students 
having GPA of 6, student A whose best and worst performance are 8 and 4 appears to 
have some (potential) area interest/ability, while student B all of whose courses were 
graded 6 probably does not.  
Graph 5 plots an index of "specialized interest" against predicted performance. 
The 80-percentile of grades attained by the graduate divided  by the 20-percentile is 
taken as a proxy of "specialization" in ability and/or interest. The higher this index, the 
more focused is the student´s interest  in some topic; presumably this helps in finding a 
professional specialization further along. As shown in Graph 5, the "initial 
attractiveness" of the graduate (as measured by predicted GPA) is inversely related to 
specialization in his interest/abilities. Regression results for this relationship are 
reported in Annex 2. This suggests that - as hypothesized previously - many 
"unattractive" candidates can still find an area of specialization that can productively 
make use of their talents. Milton Friedman (the reference is now lost to me) once 
remarked that young people engaged in frequent job rotation: "trial and error" in fact 




 Decisions regarding the design of undergraduate programs are not easy. Some 
observers feel that  many universities maintain mediocre programs, offering little more 
than an "advanced high school" type of education. Higher-quality programs obviously 
require higher costs in terms of better professors,  roomier classes, more powerfull 
computers and an up-to date library. But, they also require a higher input of student 
time,  energy and in some cases individual talents or qualifications.  
 Admission tests are a tool for sending "signals" to candidates about the 
seriousness of the institution´s focus on quality learning. The university that requires 
passing an admission test always has the option of turning down applicants. Results of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Financial aid decisions can also be cast in the logic of these two types of errors.    10 
this paper, however, caution on giving admission tests more weight than they deserve. 
The university always has the option of admitting a candidate, and later (if performance 
is substandard) forcing him to exit or take again all or part of the coursework.  
 A "liberal" admission policy may be reasonable if the costs of admitting a 
"wrong" candidate are low. Indeed, admittance allows a "wait and see" attitude. It 
allows decisions be made with better information about student potential (for example, 
performance in first year of coursework).  This liberal policy, however, requires that 
those giving the "green light" relative to continuation of studies be free from pressures 
of students, university administrators and even parents. Note that a university that 
endows students with some decision-making rights in governance (such as public 
universities in Argentina)  should be particularly carefull on deciding "who to let in". 
Paradoxically, not participating in governance has the advantage (for the student) of 
not forcing the university to erect higher barriers to entry.  
 Design of admission tests requires some  thought on human performance and 
self-satisfaction in a complex world. Clearly, not all applicants to a business program 
are going to lead multinationals into the XXI´st century. Similarly, not all economics 
undergraduates will contribute to advance in knowledge of how markets work. It takes 
much more than hard work and access to education to achieve these ends. Richard 
Bolles (1978, page 129) presents a taxonomy of "work environments"  where someone 
presumably can fit in. A wide variety of classes emerge. Among these "entreprising",  
"social", "investigative", "realistic" and "conventional".  The point to be made is that 
human beings differ markedly in their interests and capabilities. University programs 
should - where possible - cater to these differences. This might require a different 
perspective of the concept of "rigor" and "excelence"  in undergraduate education.  
 Probably the frase "scholastic aptitude tests" should be used instead of 
"admission tests". These tests are not perfect predictors of future performance. 
However, they are important pieces of information for the university making admission 
decisions, for the school from which the student graduated, as well as for the student.  
In summary, scholastic aptitude tests used correctly can be a positive factor in higher 
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Graph 1: Graduates in Economics and in Management - GPA 
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Annex 1: Regression Results (OLS)  
 
     Regression  (I)  Regression  (II) 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Data Set G   Data Sets G + S 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Dependent Variable  GPA    GPA1    
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Constant   4.48 (78.47) **   4.20 (10.0) ** 
 
 Program (a)   0.63 (3.15)  **   0.90 (5.78) * * 
  
 Verbal Ability   0.012 (1.39)   0.023 (3.92) ** 
 
 Mathematics   0.021 (3.08) **  0.012 (3.38) ** 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 R-sq adj   0.28    0.30 
 N     90    181 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
"**"  = p 10 % 
(a) Economics = 1, Management = 0 
 
The variable to be predicted (GPA) is measured in UCEMA in the scale 5 - 10. 
A "5" correponds to a marginal pass, a 6 and 7 to "good", 8 to "very good" and 9 - 10 to 
outstanding.
5 Reported GPA statistics do not take into account "0" grades (failed 
courses) as for graduates these have always been replaced by the final ( > 0) grade 
corresponding to succesfull completion of the course. Variable GPA1 represents GPA 







                                                        
5 Courses graded "0" (fail) have to be retaken before graduation. Further, a student has to maintain a GPA 
of at least 5 in order to be permited to continue his/her program. Thus, while for an individual course 
grade may be 4,  GPA at graduation is at least 5.    16 
Annex 2: Regression Results (OLS) 
 
 
     Regression III Regression IV 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Dependent Variable  GPA/GPA1  80Percentile/20 
           Percentile 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Constant   1.34 (14.2) *    2.38 
 
 Predicted GPA  -0.465 (-3.47) *  -0.14 (-4.35) 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
R-sq adj   0.11    0.17 
N    90    90 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 